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Introduction 
ince the World Trade Organization’s inception in 1995, more than 300 cases have 
been brought to its dispute-settlement system. The WTO’s predecessor, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) dealt with only over 200 disputes in 
47 years. Why do governments engage in WTO disputes? What can countries expect 
to gain from international legal trade battles? The increasing number of disputes is the 
result of expanding world trade; the increasing number of members in the 
international trade pact; the growing faith in the dispute-settlement system; and 
stricter rules negotiated in the Uruguay Round of trade talks (WTO, 2003a). Also, 
there is little punishment for market players that violate the rules (Butler and Hauser, 
2000), and trade agreements (e.g., the new Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures, or the SPS Agreement) have ambiguities that trigger 
conflict when determining whether particular measures are legitimate or not (Isaac, 
2004). 
In this article, we explore the tendency toward heightened international trade 
battles by observing the dynamics of a pending WTO dispute, that is, the Philippine-
Australian case concerning the latter’s quarantine policy on Philippine fresh fruits and 
vegetables. We begin with an overview of the dispute and proceed to examine the 
institutional, political, and economic dimensions of defending or challenging a trade 
measure in the WTO; this examination allows us to discuss, in the concluding section, 
the circumstances under which governments resort to the dispute-settlement system. 
The Philippine-Australian WTO Dispute over Fresh 
Fruits and Vegetables 
Chronology 
At question in the Philippine-Australian WTO dispute over fresh fruits and vegetables 
are Australia’s quarantine measures on fresh fruit and vegetable imports, under which 
an a priori import prohibition is in place. In Section 64 of Australia’s 1998 Quarantine 
Proclamation, it is stated that “the importation into Australia of a fresh fruit or 
vegetable is prohibited unless the Director of Quarantine has granted the person a 
permit to import it into Australia.” Through the WTO dispute-settlement system, the 
Philippines has challenged the legitimacy of the Australian import ban as well as the 
procedures and criteria for granting a permit to import fresh fruits and vegetables into 
Australia. Table 1 summarizes the chronology of the dispute through the following 
stages: 1) the Australian importers’ initial request for permits to import papaya, 
plantain, and bananas; 2) the bilateral discussions between the Australian and 
Philippine governments; 3) the conflict between the two governments as raised in the 
S   J. Javelosa and A. Schmitz 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy  60 
WTO; and 4) the review of Australian rules governing the quarantine measures on 
Philippine fruit and vegetable imports. 
 
Table 1 Chronology of the Philippine-Australian Case over Fresh Fruits and 
Vegetables 
 
Date Event  Reference 
Pre-WTO jurisdiction   












1996-2000 Bilateral  discussions  WT/DSB/M/155
a 
1998  Australia issues IRA Process Handbook  BA - 1998 IRA Handbook
b 
2000 June  Australia initiates IRA on Philippine bananas  WT/DS270/5/Rev.1
a 
2001-2002  Bilateral discussions/information exchanges  WT/DSB/M/155
a 





WTO jurisdiction  
18 Oct 2002  Philippines requests consultations in the WTO  WT/DS270/1
a 
15 Nov 2002  Philippines and Australia hold consultations  
joined in by Thailand and the EC  
WT/DS270/5/Rev.1
a 
07 July 2003  Philippines requests to establish a panel  WT/DS270/5/Rev.1
a 
21/23 July 2003  DSB considers Philippine request for a panel,  
agreeing to revert to it  
WT/DSB/M/153
a 
08 August 2003  Australia releases revised IRA Process Handbook  BA - 2003 IRA Handbook
b 




07 Nov 2003  DSB agrees to establish panel requested by the EU 
on a similar issue  
WT/DSB/M/157
a 





2004 June  Australia issues addendum to February 2004 Draft 
IRA




Late 2004  Australian government announces that Biosecurity 




Notes: a. WTO (2002, 2003b) documents (references starting with WT) can be accessed from 
http://docsonline.wto.org. 
b. Biosecurity Australia documents (referred to as BA) are available at http://www.affa.gov.au/ 
biosecurityaustralia. 
c. PBPM refers to plant biosecurity policy memoranda issued by Biosecurity Australia  
Acronyms:
  IRA: import risk analysis.
  
DSB: Dispute Settlement Body
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Requests for permits by potential importers of Philippine fresh papaya fruit were 
made before 1994, and in 1995 importers requested permits for plantain and banana. 
Bilateral discussions on the import requests commenced in 1996 in various fora, such 
as the Joint Philippine-Australian Bilateral Committee and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)–Australian dialogue, in an attempt to deal with 
Australian imports of fruits and vegetables from the Philippines. With little progress 
being made, the Philippines decided to formally raise the matter in the WTO in 2002. 
The Philippines argued that the Australian measures had prevented access to the 
Australian market for Philippine fresh fruit and vegetable exports. The Philippines 
also argued that despite continued and persistent efforts, including bilateral 
discussions and exchanges of information, unreasonable import restrictions remained. 
On 29 August 2003, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) agreed to establish 
a panel that would rule on the complaint raised by the Philippines regarding 
Australia’s aforementioned import policy. China, the European Union, Ecuador, India, 
Thailand, the United States, and Chile reserved their third-party rights to the dispute. 
In its meeting of 7  November  2003, the DSB also established a panel that was 
requested by the EU to rule on Australia’s quarantine regime for imports of live 
animals, dead animals, and animal parts; meat and meat products; dairy products; bee 
products; living plants, plant seeds, and plant parts; fresh fruits; and vegetables. While 
it did not oppose the establishment of the panel, Australia questioned the EU’s 
motivation for the request because, to a large extent, the EU did not have trade 
interests for the products under consideration (i.e., the request was not about 
commercial considerations). For a number of the products referred to above, Australia 
had no record of EU member states expressing export interests to Australia. Countries 
reserving third-party rights to the EU-Australia dispute were Canada, Chile, China, 
India, Philippines, Thailand, and the United States. As of December 2005 (i.e., over 
two years after the DSB agreed to establish a panel) no WTO panel has been set up to 
examine the Philippine-Australian case. The Philippine government (in coordination 
with the EU), has yet to craft the WTO panel’s terms of reference.
1 
Australia revised its 1998 administrative process of conducting import risk 
analysis (IRA) in 2003 to incorporate Biosecurity Australia’s (BA)
2 experience in 
conducting IRAs; the results of relevant parliamentary reviews; advice from the 
Australian Quarantine and Exports Advisory Council (QEAC); and comments from 
concerned parties. In February 2004, Australia also issued a revised draft report on the 
importation of fresh bananas from the Philippines, which made significant changes to 
the June 2002 initial draft IRA report in view of stakeholder submissions, reports, and 
technical information available to the IRA team. In sum, the 2004 IRA draft 
recommended that the importation of fresh hard-green bananas from the Philippines   J. Javelosa and A. Schmitz 
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be permitted subject to certain quarantine conditions. However, Australia has not 
begun the IRA process for Philippine fresh papaya and plantain to date. 
The February 2004 Australian banana IRA draft sparked outrage from the 
Australian Banana Growers’ Council (ABGC), banana workers, and concerned 
citizens, because they found it to have watered down Australia’s conservative 
quarantine standards. A protest rally in Cairns, Australia was staged on 5 March 2004 
(ABGC, 2004), and on 17 March 2004, BA revealed that a correction to the 2004 draft 
would have to be issued as an addendum in view of a transcription error in the 
electronic spreadsheet used in the estimation of risk. The addendum to the February 
2004 IRA draft, issued in June 2004, recommends more stringent measures for the 
importation of bananas from the Philippines in relation to two diseases (Moko and 
banana bract mosaic virus) and one pest (mealy bugs). The comment period for the 
IRA procedures was extended to 15 September 2004. 
In late 2004, the Australian government established BA as a prescribed agency to 
review all IRAs in progress. The results of their reviews will serve as the bases for 
issuing IRA drafts for further public comment. The IRAs affected by this 
announcement relate to the applications for the importation into Australia of limes 
from New Caledonia, table grapes from Chile, citrus from Florida, apples from New 
Zealand, and bananas from the Philippines. In a plant biosecurity policy memorandum 
dated 24 February 2005, BA announced that the draft IRAs for bananas from the 
Philippines and apples from New Zealand require further work, the completion of 
which is expected to take some months.  
The Philippine Complaint
3 
While WTO members are obliged to eliminate import restrictions generally, one of the 
exceptions to this general rule is the case in which restrictions are necessary to protect 
plant life and health. There are disciplines governing the implementation of such 
measures, referred to as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, embodied in the 
GATT SPS Agreement. Also, there are rules contained in the GATT Agreement on 
Import Licensing Procedures that regulate how import licences should be 
administered. The Philippines’ request to establish a WTO panel to examine 
Australian quarantine measures invoked Article XI of the GATT on the general 
elimination of quantitative restrictions as well as provisions of the two GATT 
Agreements (i.e., the SPS Agreement and the Agreement on Import Licensing). 
The Philippines claims that Australia has violated several provisions of the GATT 
SPS Agreement, in particular those that require SPS measures to be based on 
•  a risk assessment taking into account various factors (Article 5);  
•  sufficient scientific evidence (Article 2.2);  
•  international standards (Article 3);    J. Javelosa and A. Schmitz 
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•  regional conditions (of both regions of origin and destination), including 
pest or disease-free areas and low-pest prevalence or disease prevalence 
(Article 6); and 
•  the principle of nondiscrimination (Articles 2.3, Article 5.5). 
 
While the product the Philippines has economic interest in is the fresh banana 
fruit, the Philippines framed its complaint not only on the basis of the ongoing IRA on 
bananas but also on the more encompassing Australian regulation on all fresh fruits 
and vegetables. For instance, the papaya fruit and plantain have had import requests 
pending since 1994 and 1995, respectively; however, a decade has elapsed and an IRA 
has been initiated for neither papaya fruit nor plantain. Potential questions that could 
be raised by the Philippines on the Australian measures include the following: Is 
Australia’s import ban on papaya fruit and plantain justified when no IRA for either of 
these products has begun? Does this import ban meet the requirements of a WTO-
consistent SPS measure as outlined above? If Australia argues that this import ban is 
only a provisional measure (SPS Article 5.7)
4 on the basis of insufficient scientific 
evidence, is nine to ten years a reasonable period of time for maintaining this ban? 
Australia’s IRA on bananas from the Philippines raised potential questions about 
how justified Australia’s prescriptions are for managing risk with respect to diseases 
such as Moko (banana wilt) and banana bract mosaic virus and pests such as mealy 
bugs. In order to meet Australia’s allowable level of protection (ALOP), the 
quarantine measures identified to manage potential risks from Moko, for example, 
require that the source of imports be from an Australian-approved plantation in an area 
of low prevalence of Moko. The prevalence level should not exceed .003 cases 
(infected mats) per hectare per week, which is about 1 case per 7 hectares per year. 
This level should be confirmed by weekly surveys over a minimum of two years 
immediately preceding harvest of fruit intended for export to Australia. If the 
prevalence of Moko exceeds the set level in an area, the affected area will be 
suspended for a minimum of two years. Has Australia’s ALOP taken into account as 
relevant economic factors the potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales 
in the event of entry, establishment, or spread of a pest or disease; the costs of control 
or eradication in the territory of the importing member; and the relative cost 
effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks as called for by Article 5.3 of 
the SPS Agreement? Is there not an alternative measure that could meet Australia’s 
ALOP but that is less trade restrictive and more feasible technically and economically, 
as espoused by the SPS Agreement’s Article 5.6? The foregoing questions are 
potential challenges for Australia and for the WTO panel. When taking account of 
economic factors, what if Australia finds that the potential damage and lost sales due   J. Javelosa and A. Schmitz 
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to the spread of pests and disease are outweighed by the economic gains from 
importation; will Australia then be obliged to relax its ALOP? 
It may also be logical to question how different Australia’s situation is from the 
markets of other Philippine banana-importing countries such as Japan, which is 
known to have high standards generally for its quarantine measures. Japan’s imports 
of bananas are largely from the Philippines and these are subjected to the intricate 
provisions of Japan’s Plant Protection Law and Japan’s Food Sanitation Law (JETRO, 
2003, 5–14).
5 
The Philippines seems to pose the following queries with regard to the Agreement 
on Import Licensing Procedures: If Australia’s administrative process in the conduct 
of IRAs falls under the definition of non-automatic import licensing (Article 1.1
6 and 
Article 3.1
7), has it met the exception to the requirement of observing a 30-day period 
or 60-day period for processing applications as stipulated in Article 3.5(f)
8 in the case 
of papaya, plantain, or banana? Are there justifiable reasons outside the control of 
Australia to warrant an exception to this rule? Is the administrative process for 
granting import permits not trade-restrictive and not more burdensome 
administratively than is absolutely necessary (Article 3.2
9)? 
The Australian Contention 
The Australian government maintains that its quarantine system is fully WTO-
consistent when applying measures to achieve the level of sanitary and phytosanitary 
protection deemed appropriate to protect human, animal, and plant life or health 
within its territory (WTO, 2003b, e.g., WT/DSB/M/153,155,157). Australia finds it 
necessary to conduct a thorough analysis of the biosecurity risk associated with 
Philippine banana exports because there are no existing international standards 
addressing the specific quarantine concerns associated with banana imports. Australia 
has never imported fresh bananas in the past and has no existing import conditions on 
which to base a response to the Philippine proposal to export. Consistent with the 
International Plant Protection Convention’s (IPPC) International Standards for 
Phytosanitary Measures, Australia’s IRA of Philippine bananas follows three discrete 
stages: 1) the initiation of pest risk analysis;  2) risk assessment; and  3) risk 
management. The procedures adopted under each stage are also claimed to be 
consistent with IPPC norms (BA, 2004, e.g., PBPM 2004/02). 
Analysis of Dispute Costs and Benefits 
Institutional Factors 
Some institutional factors that may prompt (or inhibit) pursuing a case in the WTO 
include the nature of the dispute and optimism of the litigants, the time factor, 
litigation costs, and the absence of other legal recourse.   J. Javelosa and A. Schmitz 
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Nature of the Dispute and Optimism of Litigants 
The Philippine-Australian case over bananas illustrates the complexity of 
quarantine issues and the ambiguity (particularly in the SPS Agreement) of the 
characterization of a legitimate measure. Such nature of SPS-related issues, in 
addition to the optimism of both parties that they have the correct interpretation of the 
trade law and that they may likely win the case, seem to trigger disputes that must be 
raised in the WTO. The expected gains of both parties from a panel ruling are likely 
greater than the concessions available to either of them at this stage. Thus, they are 
unable to settle the dispute bilaterally.
10 It is interesting to note however, that of the 82 
cases that have generated a panel ruling (until July 2002), 90 percent have resulted in 
a complainant win (Guzman, 2002).
11 
Time Factor 
Attempts to settle the Philippine-Australian case bilaterally outside the WTO have 
been ongoing for approximately seven years, but have failed. Generally, bringing a 
case to the WTO provides a definite timeline in which to resolve the issue. In this 
particular case, however, there is no clear time frame for resolution because no WTO 
panel has yet been established. If the Philippines had provided the panel’s terms of 
reference within 20 days after the DSB agreed to establish a panel, the case would 
have been resolved by 2006.
12 
Litigation Costs 
WTO disputes entail litigation costs (i.e., legal and organizational costs including 
lawyer fees, consultant fees, and time, money, and effort invested by government 
officials and private industry on the case), which can be substantial. The Philippines 
taps the expertise of the Advisory Center on WTO Law (ACWL)
13 to provide legal 
assistance. As an ACWL member, an initial estimated preferential rate the Philippines 
has to pay for litigation is US$150,000. No information on lawyer fees was obtained 
from Australia, although one can expect that Australia will spend a considerable 
amount on lawyer fees.
14 A hypothesis on the economic analysis of domestic legal 
disputes that may provide an indication of litigation costs in the Philippine-Australian 
SPS case is Perloff and Rubinfield’s suggestion (1987) that defendants have more at 
stake than plaintiffs because defendants are likely to be involved in future litigation of 
the same type. In this situation, the loss to the defendant is greater than the plaintiff’s 
gain. The defendant will consequently choose to spend more on trial than will the 
plaintiff. 
If the outcome of WTO litigations were only a function of effort (i.e., litigation 
costs), poorer countries might have a disadvantage. Co-complainants and third parties   J. Javelosa and A. Schmitz 
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could play a role here in providing support when the case is argued and in reducing 
the relative cost of litigation to the developing-country complainant. 
Absence of Other Legal Recourse 
Most significantly, the WTO is the only legal forum in which to contest trade 
protection and assert a country’s export rights. An import-competing domestic 
industry can always file a case within its national jurisdiction to seek trade protection 
in the form of trade remedies, such as antidumping and countervailing duties, which 
are provided for by national laws. However, there are no such alternative legal 
avenues
15 to protect the rights of importers or of consumers who may want to access 
better prices and a wider range of product choices from abroad. In the Philippine-
Australian case, Australian distributors and consumers of bananas are limited to 
sourcing bananas from the domestic market when there are cheaper alternative sources 
of bananas elsewhere. These distributors and consumers have neither the legal 
recourse within Australian law to challenge the national quarantine regulation on 
bananas nor the option to resort to the WTO, since only governments can file a 
complaint within the WTO dispute-settlement system. Indirectly, the rights of 
Australian importers and consumers are fought for by the producers of an exporting 
country, and the only legal avenue they can utilize is the WTO. We foresee that more 
WTO disputes will be invoked to promote export interests as the clout of the 
consumer is strengthened  through improved organization and as the ownership  of 
companies crosses national boundaries while their operations become vertically 
integrated. 
Political Analysis 
Political dynamics may have influenced the Philippine-Australian case to be raised in 
the WTO. We analyze costs and benefits in terms of losses and gains in political 
support for governments and/or public officials who make the decision to pursue a 
WTO dispute. 
The driving force to have the Australian import ban on fresh fruits and vegetables 
removed emanates from the Philippine Banana Growers and Exporters Association 
(PBGEA). This group is composed of major banana-industry players affiliated mostly 
with multinationals (i.e., Dole Philippines, Inc., Del Monte Fresh Produce Philippines, 
Inc., and Chiquita Brands International through Tagum Agricultural Development 
Company).
16 Also, when the dispute was formally raised in the WTO in 2002, the 
Secretary of the Philippine Department of Agriculture was the former chair of the 
PBGEA, the family-controlled Lapanday Foods Corporation, and Del Monte 
Philippines, Inc.
17 Clearly, the PBGEA could gain from liberalized banana trade.  
Meanwhile, the Australian Banana Growers’ Council, Inc. (ABGC) strongly 
resisted changes to Australia’s restrictive quarantine policy. ABGC is the Australian   J. Javelosa and A. Schmitz 
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banana industry’s peak national agro-political organization and represents 1,900 
banana growers. It was established in February 1961, and in August 1992 it took the 
initiative of creating a full-time national secretariat based in Brisbane.  Owners of 
banana plantations in Australia with at least one-half hectare of bananas under 
production (i.e., commercial banana plantation owners) may become members of 
ABGC. Members have to pay 2¢ per 13 kg carton of bananas sold (ABGC, 2005). It is 
in the interest of this group to oppose the importation of Philippine bananas. 
On the other hand, the Australian dairy producers led by the Australian Dairy 
Corporation
18 (ADC) have been allies of the Philippine banana producers. The ADC 
fears that the Philippines will retaliate against Australia’s restrictive quarantine policy 
and will make good its threat to ban Australian products from Philippine shores. In an 
attempt to stop this ban, the ADC urged the Australian government to adopt a less 
rigid solution to the IRA being conducted by BA. In a 2002 parliamentary hearing on 
the banana-quarantine process, which was prior to the complaint being filed in the 
WTO, the ADC submitted its position, stressing that BA should consider that A$364.4 
million dairy earnings from the Philippines are worth much more than the A$321 
million Australian banana industry (Felix, 2002).  
Private interest groups with economic interests in the case spend substantial time 
and effort to pressure governments to support their trade positions. The ABGC, for 
example, is devoting considerable resources in media releases, information 
dissemination activities, rallies, campaigns, and research to oppose through lobbying 
the importation of Philippine bananas. 
In the Philippines, the government has gained the political support of banana 
producers and other domestic producers in its move to pursue the case against 
Australia in the WTO. Filing a complaint in the WTO stirs the confidence of 
agribusiness firms, providing the impression that the Philippine government is a 
reliable partner in promotion of export interests. Even if the Philippines were to lose 
the WTO case, political gains have already been achieved in the domestic political 
arena (although criticisms of how the case was managed will no doubt arise
19). On the 
international front, an image of toughness might also help the Philippines as it 
embarks on WTO negotiations, particularly in agriculture. 
Australia has a double-edged political stake: it has to balance the conflicting 
interests of its domestic constituents while maintaining its international standing as a 
lead advocate of agricultural trade liberalization. If the WTO panel (if established) 
rules against Australia’s measures and Australia does not comply, it weakens the 
country’s moral authority to lead the Cairns Group
20 in pushing for fairer trade rules in 
agriculture. Australia also stands to lose the political support of sectors that may be 
affected by compensation or retaliatory measures, while it stands to gain the support 
of its local banana growers. Allowing the WTO panel to decide on the case perhaps   J. Javelosa and A. Schmitz 
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reduces the burden on Australia to cave in to domestic rent-seeking. If Australia loses 
the case and complies with the WTO ruling, it may still obtain reputation gains 
internationally, but at home it may be criticized for its failure to defend Australian 
quarantine measures. The political cost to Australian leaders may be less if the WTO 
ruling mandates the policy change rather than if Australia unilaterally relaxes its 
quarantine rules to allow Philippine banana imports into its country. 
Economic Assessment 
We examine the economic motivations related to the case by estimating the magnitude 
of the trade-related economic stakes of both the Philippines and Australia as the 
former challenges Australia’s measure and the latter defends its a priori import ban on 
Philippine fruits and vegetables. We approximate the size of these economic stakes by 
focusing on the banana market, initially considering a scenario in which Australia 
allows the importation of Philippine bananas; it is assumed for purposes of this 
assessment that no pests and no disease are brought into Australia by these imports. 
Section A of the technical annex provides an overview of the Australian banana 
market and presents the model and procedure used to calculate the welfare effects of 
relaxing Australia’s challenged import ban. Our results show that lifting Australia’s 
import ban will allow imports of Philippine bananas ranging from 77,000 tons to 
315,000 tons, depending on how responsive producers are to price changes (table 2, 
columns 3 to 5). The lower Australian banana import estimate of 77,000 tons is only 
24 percent of the total projected Australian banana consumption, while the upper 
bound of 315,000 tons implies that all of Australian banana consumption will come 
from imports. 
Assuming that the proportion of 2003 marketing margins we used in the 
calculations holds, the Australian farm-gate price drops from A$0.98/kg to A$0.70/kg 
when imports come into Australia at A$0.85/kg. This change reduces producer welfare 
in Australia by an amount ranging from A$38 million to A$70 million, while 
consumer welfare improves substantially by A$175 million. Net economic welfare 
gains range from A$105 million to A$138 million; the upper bound is a case in which 
the import price elicits a no-production response by growers. These estimates show 
the case in which banana imports do not spread pests and diseases to bananas 
produced locally. Under this scenario, it is in Australia’s net economic interest to 
remove the ban, although its producers clearly stand to lose.  
Even if we consider an extreme case in which the importation of Philippine 
bananas wipes out the remaining banana production in Australia due to pest and 
disease contamination from Philippine banana imports, our simple model shows that 
Australia can still achieve net economic gains. This is shown in two scenarios (see 
table 2, columns 4 and 5) where the net welfare gains from banana importation   J. Javelosa and A. Schmitz 
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outweigh the value of remaining Australian banana production (i.e., remaining 
producer surplus). In addition to these gains are those that can be obtained by 
wholesalers/ripeners, retailers, and other users of bananas (e.g., the processing 
industry) due to expanded demand for their services; these latter gains are not 
quantified in our simple model. However, there is one scenario in which Australia can 
incur a net loss (see table 2, column 3). This is the case in which net welfare gains 
from banana importation, valued at A$105 million, are not enough to compensate for 
the loss of Australian producer surplus worth A$132 million when the remaining 
whole Australian banana industry is wiped out due to pests and diseases associated 




Table 2  Economic Welfare Effects of Lifting the Ban on Banana Imports in Australia,     





With lifting of  
import ban 
If import price increases due 
to cost of quarantine 
measures 






















Wholesale price (A¢/kg)  118  85  85  85  110  110  110 
Producer price (A¢/kg)  98  70  70  70  91  91  91 
Distribution centre price (A¢/kg)  141  102  102  102  132  132  132 
Retail price (A¢/kg)  212  153  153  153  198  198  198 
Consumption ('000 tons)  276  315  315  315  285  285  285 
Consumption per capita (kg)  14  16  16  16  14.3  14.3  14.3 
Consumption expenditure, retail (A$mil)  585  480  480  480  564  564  564 
Production marketed (‘000 tons)  276  237  199  0  267  258  0 
Production value at farm gate (A$mil)  270  167  140  0  244  236  0 
Imports ('000 tons)  0  77  116  315  18  27  285 
Imports (A$mil)  0  66  98  267  20  30  314 
Self sufficiency (%)  100  75  63  0  94  90  0 
Change in consumer welfare (A$mil)  n.a.  175  175  175  39  39  39 
Change in producer welfare (A$mil)  n.a.  -70  -65  -38  -18  -17  -9 
Change in net economic welfare 
(A$mil) 
n.a.  105  110  138  22  22  30 
Remaining producer surplus (A$mil)  n.a.  132  70  0  185  118  0 
*See section A of the technical annex for model assumptions. 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
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Another scenario is to cost out the additional expenses that Philippine banana 
exporters will have to incur for the Australian-imposed quarantine measures. If, due to 
added costs to implement quarantine requirements, the import price increases by 38.8 
percent, which increases the cost, insurance, and freight (c.i.f.) import price of 
Philippine bananas to about A$1.18/kg, the net welfare gains from importing bananas 
will be cancelled out. With anything less than a 38.8 percent import price increase on 
Philippine banana imports (e.g., under the scenarios in table 2, columns 6 to 8), 
positive net economic gains can still result for Australia. 
Meanwhile, Australian imports of Philippine bananas can increase Philippine 
banana exports by 5 to 19 percent. Section B of the technical annex gives a profile of 
the Philippine banana market and shows the economic model used for approximating 
potential benefits to the Philippines under a scenario in which Australia allows free 
trade in bananas. Increased Philippine banana exports could translate to an increase in 
producer surplus amounting from US$14 million to US$63 million (table 3).
22 
 
Table 3 Foregone Philippine Economic Surplus due to Australia’s Import Ban on  
Bananas, 2003 
 
Index  Scenario 1 / Supply elasticities  Scenario 2 / Supply elasticities 
   0.5  1  3.57  0.5  1  3.57 
Foregone imports ('000 tons)  77  116  315  48  86  285 
Year 2002 level of Phil. banana exports 
('000 tons)  1,685  1,685  1,685  1,685  1,685  1,685 
Percent increase in export demand 
(base=2002)  5  7  19  3  5  17 
Year 2002 price/'000 ton of Phil. banana 
exports (US$ f.o.b.)  183,317  183,317  183,317  183,317  183,317  183,317 
Expected price increase/'000 ton* of  
Phil. banana exports due to increased 
export demand (US$ f.o.b.) 
8,377  12,620  34,270  5,222  9,356  31,006 
Foregone economic surplus (US$)  14,437,950 21,996,771 63,142,502 8,924,559  16,167,606 56,663,834 
Scenario 1: Assumed c.i.f. import price in Australia is A$0.85/kg or US$651,192/'000 ton. 
Scenario 2: Assumed c.i.f. import price in Australia is A$1.10/kg or US$842,719/'000 ton. 
* Assumes that a 1 percent increase in quantity demanded raises the price of Philippine banana 
exports by 1 percent. 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
If Australia allows the importation of Philippine bananas while imposing 
quarantine measures in addition to what Philippine producers are already applying, the 
cost of these additional measures will determine the extent to which economic 
benefits accruing to Philippine producers will be diminished. As the cost of these 
quarantine measures increases, net welfare benefits for Philippine producers (and   J. Javelosa and A. Schmitz 
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Australian consumers) will be reduced. For example, if quarantine measures increase 
the import price of bananas from the Philippines to A$1.10/kg, the new level of 
Australian imports will range from 18 thousand tons to 285 thousand tons (table 2, 
columns 6 to 8). This amount of imports will reduce the range of Philippine producer 
surplus from US$14 million–US$63 million to US$9 million–US$57 million.  
An analysis solely based on trade-related economic costs and benefits shows that 
it is in the economic interest of the Philippines to attempt to open up the Australian 
market for its banana exports. Meanwhile, Australia may lose or win on aggregate 
from lifting the import ban, depending on how price responsive local supply (and 
demand) are and on the extent to which Philippine bananas can truly contaminate 
Australian local produce. More rigorous econometric methods may be applied to 
estimate supply (and demand) curves and derive more definitive estimates of 
corresponding welfare effects of trade policy options. However, crucial information 
on the risks that quarantine measures attempt to mitigate and the extent to which 
quarantine provision reduces the likelihood of the threat to the domestic industry 
being protected may be hard to find – and estimates or assumptions can be wanting, 
contentious, and subject to lobbying pressures. 
Concluding Notes 
ased on our foregoing analysis of the Philippine-Australian WTO dispute, we 
find a host of economic, political, and institutional factors that can provide the 
motivation for public officials to take their trade policy disagreements into the WTO 
jurisdiction. The complexity of SPS issues governed by international trade rules that 
allow ample discretion in the conduct of quarantine policies, compounded by the 
uncertainty of risks that quarantine measures purport to address, seem to spur 
disagreement among trading parties. We also note that the political impetus is strong 
for both the Philippines and Australia to bring their cases to the WTO. This 
observation parallels those of others who have explored the role of agricultural 
interest groups in border disputes (e.g., Bredahl, Schmitz and Hillman, 1987; Picketts, 
Schmitz and Schmitz 1991; Schmitz, 1988). While freer trade for agriculture may be 
in the public economic interest, reform toward further trade liberalization involves 
gainers and losers. Those interest groups who will lose from the policy change clearly 
will attempt to block the reform (and likely will influence policymakers). 
While there is an economic motivation (albeit not totally unambiguous) for 
Australia to relax its banana-import prohibition, it seems difficult for Australia to do 
so with producer interest groups holding a strong political lobby. A ruling by the WTO 
rather than a unilateral quarantine policy change seems to be a more attractive 
recourse politically. On the part of the Philippines, while there seems to be a clear 
economic rationale for the government to pursue a WTO dispute, the sizable litigation 
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costs given the tight resources of the country may suggest consideration of other, less 
costly, routes to promote exports. Could Philippine exporters not achieve the same 
market-access gains by expanding old markets or by exploring markets other than 
Australia whose current quarantine policy will allow the importation of Philippine 
fruit and vegetables? We surmise that even if alternative means to achieve the same 
market-access gains are available, the WTO dispute process is a more attractive 
recourse for government leaders because of the political gains they may obtain in the 
process (e.g., political support of exporters – gains that may be absent or less if 
alternative export promotion routes are undertaken). In addition, the private sector 
may also push for the WTO route, because government primarily shoulders litigation 
costs. Meanwhile, export promotion expenses are likely to be financed by the private 
exporting companies. Also, the WTO dispute-settlement system will continue to be 
opted for by exporting countries since it is the only legal mechanism available to 
further open markets. Prospective importers have limited or no other recourse at all 
within national jurisdictions to enforce the right to import. 
When costs and benefits of each option in a dispute are not fixed, game theory 
suggests that the choice of optimal behavior depends on the choice of the other party. 
It is interesting to note that no WTO panel has yet been established to hear the 
Philippine-Australian case more than two years after the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body agreed in August 2003 to establish a panel. The Philippines can always initiate 
the process of panel establishment by providing the panel’s terms of reference, but it 
has chosen not to do so. This suggests that, perhaps, the Philippines is using this as a 
threat tactic to have Australian fruit and vegetable imports liberalized without a formal 
decision by the WTO.  
Throughout our discussion in this paper, we have treated expectations of winning 
a case in the WTO, particularly for the complainant, to be synonymous to having 
trade-distorting measures corrected to yield trade-related economic gains serving the 
national interest. How realistic are these expectations? The record of noncompliance 
with recent WTO rulings, such as in the Brazil-United States cotton case and the 
Brazil-EU sugar case, may dampen these expectations. Does the WTO dispute-
settlement system have enough teeth to enforce its decisions? If the WTO dispute-
settlement system is not strong enough to enforce its decisions, trade and welfare 
economists may not be able to recommend WTO disputes as feasible recourses to 
promote exports, because they are effectively diminished into political ploys with 
negative net present values of economic benefits and less-than-one benefit-cost ratios. 
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Endnotes 
                                                      
*    Without implicating them, the authors acknowledge Stephen Powell for his 
stimulating international trade law and dispute settlement class that provided the   J. Javelosa and A. Schmitz 
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motivation for developing this article and Segfredo Serrano for the topic 
suggestion. The authors also thank two anonymous referees for their helpful 
comments and Carole Schmitz for editorial refinements. Yin (1994) and Josling 
and Taylor (2003) were also useful references for the structure of the article.  
1.   Article 6.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) provides that in case the applicant requests the 
establishment of the panel with other than standard terms of reference, the written 
request shall include the proposed text of special terms of reference. The standard 
terms of reference of panels are as follows: “To examine, in the light of the 
relevant provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to 
the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document … 
and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations 
or in giving the rulings provided for in that/those agreements(s).” (GATT 
Secretariat, 1994) 
2.   Biosecurity Australia is a major operating group within the Australian 
Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. It is responsible 
for import risk analyses (IRAs) and assessments of quarantine risks associated 
with commodity and germplasm imports, as well as technical negotiations on 
export market access issues. It also works with other relevant agencies to address 
Australia’s participation in international standard-setting organizations and WTO 
activities with respect to sanitary and phytosanitary measures. 
3.   This section draws from the Philippines’ request to establish a WTO panel 
(WT/DS270/5/Rev.1). Through a reading of the Philippine complaint from an 
outside observer’s perspective, the authors attempt to elaborate on the issues 
raised by the Philippines and relate them to Australia’s measures and obligations 
as members of the WTO. 
4.   Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement reads as follows:  
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may 
provisionally adopt SPS measures on the basis of available pertinent 
information, including that from the relevant international organizations as 
well as SPS measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, 
Members shall seek to obtain additional information necessary for a more 
objective assessment of risk and review the SPS measure accordingly within a 
reasonable period of time. (GATT Secretariat, 1994) 
5.   In 2002, 79.4 percent of Japan’s banana imports came from the Philippines 
(JETRO, 2003, 4). 
6.   Article 1.1 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures reads as follows:  
For the purpose of this Agreement, import licensing is defined as 
administrative procedures used for the operation of import licensing regimes 
requiring the submission of an application or other documentation (other than 
that required for customs purposes) to the relevant administrative body as 
prior condition for importation into the customs territory of the importing 
Member. (GATT Secretariat, 1994) 
7.   Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures reads as follows:  
Non-automatic import licensing procedures are defined as import licensing 
not falling within the definition contained in paragraph 1 of Article 2   J. Javelosa and A. Schmitz 
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(“Automatic import licensing is defined as import licensing where approval of 
the application is granted in all cases ….”). (GATT Secretariat, 1994) 
8.   Article 3.5(f) of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures reads as follows:  
The period for processing applications shall, except when not possible for 
reasons outside the control of the Member, not be longer than 30 days if 
applications are considered as and when received, i.e., on a first-come, first-
served, basis, and no longer than 60 days if all applications are considered 
simultaneously. (GATT Secretariat, 1994) 
9.   Article 3.2 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures reads as follows: 
Non-automatic licensing shall not have trade-restrictive or distortive effects 
on imports additional to those caused by the imposition of the restriction. 
Non-automatic licensing procedures shall correspond in scope and duration to 
the measure they are used to implement, and shall be no more administratively 
burdensome than absolutely necessary to administer the measure. (GATT 
Secretariat, 1994) 
10.  As long as there are gains from settlement, parties are expected to reach an 
agreement to maximize their joint gains. However, in a case with an all or nothing 
character (for example health and safety regulations), transfers can be limited 
(more so than if the case were about issues such as tariffs). Thus, there is less 
room to compromise (Guzman and Simmons, 2002). 
11. Guzman (2002) suggests that asymmetry in the payoffs from the panel ruling and 
asymmetry in the cost of delay contribute to an explanation of the complainant 
win rate. 
12. The authors’ estimated timeline based on actual events and timetable outlined in 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(GATT Secretariat 1994) and the WTO dispute-settlement primer can be found at  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp2_e.htm. Guzman (2002) 
notes that there are significant opportunities for delay in the dispute process, and 
from the defendant’s perspective, delay is desirable – all else equal – because 
WTO rules permit the defendant to maintain the disputed practice as the case is 
ongoing, political leaders continue to gain political and economic rents from the 
activity, and there is no offsetting cost for losing defendants to pay damages for 
violative activities. 
13. The Advisory Center on WTO Law (ACWL) is a public international organization 
independent of the WTO that was established in 2001 to provide legal advice on 
WTO law, support in WTO dispute-settlement proceedings, and training in WTO 
law to developing countries and customs territories, countries with economies in 
transition, and least-developed countries. 
14. Kisanwatch, a public information website that monitors the impact of 
developments in world trade on Indian agriculture and farmers’ livelihoods, cites 
that international law firms dealing with WTO disputes (usually U.S.-based) 
charge anything from US$250 per hour to US$1,000 per hour in fees 
(Kisanwatch, 2001). 
15. Competition policy and antitrust regulations somehow address these consumer 
rights, but only in a domestic context.   J. Javelosa and A. Schmitz 
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16. See multinational affiliation of Philippine banana companies in Fagan (2004). The 
Philippines started exporting bananas in the late 1960s upon the establishment of 
plantations by the multinationals. A list of PBGEA members is available from 
DA-AMAS (2004). 
17. The Department of Agriculture, the Department of Trade and Industry, and the 
Department of Foreign Affairs are the primary executive offices in charge of this 
WTO trade dispute in the Philippines. 
18. On 1 July 2003, Dairy Australia replaced Australian Dairy Corporation (ADC) 
and Dairy Research and Development Corporation (DRDC), assuming their 
functions other than the export control functions, which returned to government. 
19. Some militant farmer groups are critical of the former Secretary of Agriculture, 
during whose term the dispute was formally raised at the WTO. A farmer leader 
was quoted as saying that the “Secretary of Agriculture’s programs only benefit 
big landlords and agro-corporations, while farmers receive a bunch of empty 
promises. His fanatical implementation of agricultural trade liberalization and the 
rampant importation of agricultural products in accordance with World Trade 
Organization (WTO) policies continue to inflict havoc to farmers’ lives mainly for 
the benefit of U.S. agro-corporations. We cannot expect a Cabinet member who 
represents big agro-corporations to heed the demands of the poorest sector of the 
country.” (Cyberdyaryo, 2003) 
20. Australia leads the Cairns Group (CG) of 17 countries, which together account for 
one-third of the world’s agricultural exports. Since it formed in 1986, the CG has 
succeeded in putting agriculture on the multilateral trade agenda and keeping it 
there. The Cairns Group is an excellent example of successful coalition building 
in the trade area. By acting collectively it has had more influence and impact on 
the agriculture negotiations than any of its individual members could have had 
independently. Members of the group are Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Paraguay, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. 
21. Alternatively, we can model the contraction in output and additional production 
costs for pest and disease control as a shift to the left in the Australian banana 
supply curve to approximate welfare changes under such a scenario where banana 
imports that can contaminate local produce with pests and disease are allowed. 
22. In the absence of studies looking into the effect of increased demand on Philippine 
export prices, we assumed that a unit increase in quantity demanded will cause a 
unit increase in the Philippine export price for bananas. In addition to farm-level 
producer gains, there will also be gains from the transport of bananas, which is 
usually done through independent reefer carriers or by the fleet owned by the 
multinational banana companies (UNCTAD, 2002). 
 
The technical annex to this paper, pages 78-83 is available as a separate document. 
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